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BY PRESERVED SMITH.
THE science of comparative religion having of late attained S3
much notoriety, it is time to inquire whether the comparative
method can be applied to one religion in different periods of its
life. Is there any common measure applicable to the same religion
in succeeding ages to ascertain its variations in quality and amount i
The difficulties of doing this are obvious, and ha\e been lucidly
stated by the late Professor Alayo-Smith in his works on statistics.
Some matters are at once so large and so vague that they burst the
bonds of accurate measurement. It is the general observation of
explorers that savages in warm countries wear few clothes and
worship fetishes, but to express these facts in numbers is beyond
the resources at our command. So also in measuring the "culture
religions'" the double difficulty of selecting a yardstick and of thor-
oughly applying it renders most attempts nugatory. The endeavor
to ascertain the quantity of extant piety by a house to house census
would of course be so impractical as to be ridiculous. The selection
of anv external criterion, such as the seating capacity of the
churches, is fallacious. An .\merican town in the throes of a
revival which has caught ninety per cent of the inhabitants may well
have a smaller per capita church capacity than a French village,
whose vast and venerable cathedral is frequented only by a few
women, the drift-wood left high and dry by the ebbing tide of faith.
The test of church membership, too, is unsatisfactory, more on
account of individual variation than because of dift'erences between
the several sects in counting their constituency. Allowance can be
made for the fact that Catholics reckon as members all who have
been baptized, whereas Protestants count only those who have
passed a second rite like confirmation. But who can tell what
membership in a church really means? There have always been
a few devout men, like Milton, who do not formally identify them-
222 THE OPEN COURT.
selves with any denomiiialion ; there are probably many pew-holders
who have in their hearts little faith. Only omniscience can do more
than gness at- their nnmbers.
But notwithstanding all this I believe that by reducing the
number of individuals examined, while at the same time keeping
them strictly representative, some common measure can be applied
to different societies, or to the same society at divers times. Now
there happens to be one class exactly adapted to our purpose, at
once small, constant, thoroughly representative, and whose opinions
on most subjects are, almost without exception, easily ascertain-
able—the great men.
No more accurate barometer could be desired, for great men
are always representative either of the people as a whole, or of the
intellectual class which in the long run dominates and leads the
masses. Even in this they are like a barometer, that they register
changes in the atmosphere before these are sensible to ordinary
observation. When the mercury goes down it is safe to predict
rain ; the increase in the number of religious great men in the fif-
teenth century foreshadows the Reformation in the sixteenth. One
kind of great man may with perfect accuracy be described as the
"demagogue," even if he be as splendid a one as Napoleon. The
second kind may be typified by Darwin, who appealed only to a
small body of experts, and yet whose thoughts were destined in
due time to become the mental stock-in-trade of the masses. In
1860 his theory of the origin of species would have been voted
down by a million to one, but because there were a hundred men
capable of understanding him, whom, that is, in a sense, he repre-
sented, the final triumph of his theory—in gross, not in detail
—
was assured. Indeed the history of what we call progress is essen-
tially a history of the intellectual class, just as a biography is almost
entirely the record of the action of a man's brain. The thinking
class is the head also in the sense of being the vanguard, which the
vast body, usually with much writhing and reluctance, is bound
eventually to follow. In some cases, of course, great men appeal
to and represent both the cultured and the popular classes. Luther
and Lincoln are examples of this type.
Probably every one will agree that there are no persons in the
world whose opinions on all subjects are easier to ascertain than
are those of the great dead. If their public utterances are equivocal
their private letters and conversations are published and subjected
to the minute scrutiny of hundreds of able minds. They are not,
as a rule, hypocrites ; their very greatness often consists in devotion
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to one idea which they are determined to impresss on the world
at any cost. Sometimes their ruling passion forces them to dis-
semble their beliefs on what they regard as minor matters, even if
these matters be religion and morality,—but how few do they de-
ceive in the end ! Chesterfield's remark that a wise atheist would
conceal his opinions lights up that wardrobe which he called his
mind quite as brightly as anything else he was capable of saying.
In averring that "all wise men have the same religion but no wise
man tells what it is." Talleyrand told what his religion was, as
plainly as did \'oltaire. The other epigram of the distinguished
diplomat that "language was made to conceal thought," exposed
his own thought with almost glaring indecency. It is always the
same story: Peter may deny Christ, but in the very act his speech
bewrayeth him. Xapoleon's elaborate pretence of hearing mass
while he was dictating his correspondence may have imposed on a
few peasants : it has intrigued none of his biographers.
But are there no exceptions to this rule? Cannot one find
arguments to prove that Shakespeare was a royalist and a demo-
crat ; a Protestant, a Catholic and a skeptic ; showing that there is
difficulty in ascertaining his true personal views? Yes; but in the
immense literature of the subject we can also find it proved that
he was a lawyer, an alienist, a criminal, a degenerate, and Francis
Bacon. Notwithstanding the paradoxes advanced on all sides I
think there is a consensus of reliable opinion to the efifect that Shake-
speare was Shakespeare, that he was a rational and law-abiding
citizen, that he was a playwright, and that in matters of both poli-
tics and religion he was supremely indififerent. Had he been other-
wise, he well could, and surely would, have expressed himself, either
in the sense of Montaigne or in that of Milton. But indifference
stamps a man just as categorically as does the most passionate
partisanship.
Admitting the possibility of getting an approximately accurate
estimate of the religiosity of most eminent persons, it is plain that
the comparative method can be applied, and that interesting results
as to the proportion of religion in different ages will be forth-
coming. The problem is now to draw up a list of men and formu-
late some standard of religion to apply to them. Evidently the
matter of greatest importance in making a list is that it shall be
without bias. It is not so necessary that the two hundred names
here selected should be absolutely the greatest for the last eight
centuries, as it is that they should be chosen without parti pris.
I believe that I have attained that result by making the basis of my
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list the biographical material in the last edition of the Encydopccdia
Britannica. Those Englishmen of the nineteenth century, and those
only, whose biography occupies three or more pages in the Encydo-
pccdia, are included. Feeling that the editors were naturally favor-
able to Englishmen, and seeing that my list was far larger for recent
than for preceding ages, I have shaded this standard by including
some recent foreigners, and men of all nationalities for the earlier
centuries, to whom a smaller space is accorded, but always pro-
gressively and regularly, by a fixed method, not by personal pref-
erence. On the whole the list agrees well with what I should
independently have drawn up, though not always. Had I relied
solely on my own judgment, for instance, I should have included
Nietzsche and excluded Ruskin. So I believe the roster here pre-
sented will be nearly identical with any possible one made by his-
torians, differing here and there in detail, but not substantially
altered. The point that I insist upon, however, is not that this
selection is the best possible from all points of view, but simply
that, being made without bias, it may be assumed to be perfectly
representative. For present purposes I have thought it advisable
to take into consideration only the nations of western European
culture, which knows only two religions, the Jewish and the Chris-
tian. The great Asiatic conquerors, and even oriental philosophers
and savants, like Averroes and Avicenna, had they been included,
would only have confused the issue.
In formulating categories and applying them to individuals,
I have been obliged to rely on my own judgment. Before criticizing
my methods, I hope the reader will take into account my definition
of the terms used. By "religion" I do not mean the broadest sense
of the term, to include all religions, or as philosophically defined,
"man's emotional reaction to the not understood," or the like. I
use the word in a narrower, but perfectly legitimate sense, perhaps
best covered by the old-fashioned term "revealed religion," although
some modern earnest Christians and Jews explain away the revela-
tion or supernatural portion of their faiths almost to the vanishing
point. The designations "established" or "popular religion," would,
on the other hand, have been too restricted, for many of the most
devout men have attacked the church, as did Huss and Luther.
Conversely my use of the word "skepticism" is not the philosoph-
ical one designating complete Pyrrhonism, but is simply the opposite
of religiosity. If, in his own consciousness, a man stands outside
of all the recognized forms of organized religion of his age, he is,
in my sense of the word, a skeptic. As Voltaire made it his object
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to destroy Christianity, his deism cannot entitle him to be regarded
as devont. Spinoza may have been drunk with God, but as he
was a total abstainer from the practice of his own early faith, and
acquired no Christianity, he is, in the present use of the term, a
skeptic. In a statistical inquiry rigid definitions are not only legiti-
mate but necessary.
According to these general principles I have adopted a four-
fold classification of men as Religious, Pious, Indififerent and Skep-
tical. I attach no importance whatever to the terms, which are
simply intended to designate dififerent degrees of religiosity. In
the first class I include those persons who have devoted the best
part of their lives to the support and propagation of religion. In
the second class are placed those who, while living for a more
secular vocation, have given evidence of their full belief in the
Christian creed, and their incidental support to it. The Indifferent
are those whose interest in religion is at a minimum, the cares of
the world having sprung up and choked the seed of piety. Shake-
speare, for instance, as Emerson has emphasized, showed prac-
tically no interest in the beyond. In others, doubtless, a non-
committal attitude is assumed from prudential motives, but had
the interest been really strong it would have burst the barriers of
reserve. In the last category, the Skeptical, I have placed all who
have deliberately and confessedly taken a stand outside of Chris-
tianity (or, in a few cases, outside of Judaism). Their attitude
varies from the cool, and even sympathetic criticism of Gibbon and
Renan, to the implacable hostility of Voltaire and Shelley.
Each man is taken at his word, not according to the effect of
his work in the estimation of others. Nietzsche and the Catholics
argue that Luther did more than any other man to hurt Christian-
ity. Bernard Shaw has asserted that all the real religion of to-day
has been made possible by materialists and atheists. There seems
to be something more than paradox in both these positions, but
they are irrelevant to the purpose of the present study. Here, only
the attitude which a man himself desires to take, is estimated. If
he devotes his whole life to the reform and propagation of religion
he is religious, even if thereby he rends Christianity in twain. If
he shouts Ecrasez I'infame ! on all possible occasions, he is irre-
ligious, even though the total effect of his work on Christian thought
is salutary.
Men are not always consistent, and are hardly ever subject to
easy classification, because the degrees and shades of opinion are
infinite. Was Jeanne d'Arc primarily a prophetess or a patriot?
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Was it Milton's chief end, or only an important subordinate one,
to justify the ways of God to man? What shall we say about
Swift? He was a high ecclesiastic, and occasionally expressed him-
self in devout language ; but on the other hand was religion ever
more eflfectively satirized than in The Tale of a Tub, or in that
passage in Gullivers Travels where the Lilliputian sects fight over
the question of which end of an egg to open? Goethe is a still
more glaring example of contradictoriness. Certain passages in his
works, and still more in his Conversations with Eckermann, are
edifying tributes both to Christianity and to Protestantism. But
when religion interfered with business or pleasure, did Goethe ever
hesitate to choose the latter? What writings are more saturated
with Hellenism, free thought and pantheism than Faust and
Werther? So in many other cases I have been obliged to place a
man in one of the four classes, although he seemed rather to be on
the borderline between two, or even, alternately, in more than two
of the divisions. In submitting my results, I can claim only to
have acted with the utmost impartiality and objectivity at my com-
mand. Asking the usual allowance for human error, I hereby pre-
sent the statistics on which I base my results, after which a few
generalizations will bring out their meaning. After each name I
have put the dates of birth and death, and a letter indicating the
class to which the person is assigned.
Abelard, 1075-1142. r. Wycliffe, 1324-84. r.
Arnold of Brescia, fUSS. r. Chaucer, 1328-1400. i.
St. Bernard, 1090-1153. r. D'Ailly, 1350-1420. r.
Becket, tll70. r.
Alanus de Insulis, 1114-1203. r. Person, 1363-1429. r.
Huss, 1373-1415. r.
Innocent III, 1160-1216. r. Froissart, 1377-1410. i.
St. Dominic, 1170-1221. r. Donatello. c. 1386-1466. p.
St. Francis, 1182-1226. r. Fra Angelico, 1387-1455. r.
Albertus Magnus, 1193-1285. r. A Kempis, tl471, r.
Gutenberg, 1400-68. i.
Roger Bacon, 1214-94. p. j^^^^^ ^>^^^^ 1412-81. r.
Aquinas, 1227-74. r. Torquemada, 1420-98. r.
Marco Polo, 1254-1324. i. Botticelli, 1444-1510. p.
Dante, 1265-1321. p. Columbus, 1446-1506. p.
Duns Scotus, 1274-1308 r.
Occam, tl347. r. Da Vinci, 1452-1519. i.
Petrarch, 1304-74. p. Erasmus, 1466-1536. p.
Boccaccio, 1313-75. i. Macchiavelli, 1469-1530. s.
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Durer, 1471-1528. p.
Copernicus, 1473-1543. i.
Ariosto, 1474-1533. i.
Michelangelo. 1475-1564. p.
Wolsey, 1475-1530. p.
More, 1477-1535. p.
Titian, 1477-1576. i.
Loyola, 1491-1556. r.
Raphael, 1483-1520. p.
Luther, 1483-1546. r.
Zwingli, 1484-1531. r.
Del Sarto, 1487-1531. i.
Holbein, 1493-1554. i.
Correggio, 1494-1534. i.
Rabelais, 1495-1553. s.
iAlelanchthon, 1497-1560. r.
Cellini, 1500-71. i.
Knox, 1505-72. r.
Xavier, 1506-56. r.
Calvin, 1509-64. r.
Tintoretto, 1512-94. i.
Coligny, 1517-72. p.
Camoens, 1524-79. i.
Veronese, 1528-88. p.
Montaigne, 1533-92. s.
Scaliger, 1540-1609. p.
Tasso, 1544-95. p.
Oldenbarneveldt, 1547-1619. p.
Bruno, 1548-1600. s.
Henri IV, 1553-1610. i.
Spenser, 1553-99. i.
Francis Bacon, 1561-1626. s.
Shakespeare, 1564-1616. i.
Galileo, 1564-1642. i.
Marlowe, 1564-93. s.
Kepler, 1571-1630. i.
Jonson, 1574-1637. i.
Rubens, 1577-1640. p.
Harvey, 1578-1637. i.
Fletcher, 1579-1625. i.
Grotius, 1583-1645. s.
Beaumont, 1584-1616. i.
Jansen, 1585-1638. r.
Richelieu. 1585-1642. p.
Hobbes, 1588-1679. s.
Descartes, 1596-1650. s.
Cromwell, 1599-1658. p.
Van Dyke, 1599-1641. i.
Velazquez, 1599-1660. i.
Calderon, 1600-81. p.
Mazarin, 1602-61. i.
Corneille, 1606-84. p.
Rembrandt, 1606-69. i.
Milton, 1608-74. p.
Murillo, 1617-82. p.
Colbert, 1619-82. i.
La Fontaine, 1621-95. s.
Moliere, 1622-73. i.
Pascal, 1623-62. p.
Sevigne, 1626-96. p.
Bossuet, 1627-1704. r.
Bunyan. 1628-88. r.
Dryden, 1630-1701. p.
Locke, 1632-1704. s.
Spinoza, 1632-77. s.
Racine, 1639-99. p.
Penn, 1644-1718. p.
Leibnitz, 1646-1716. p.
Newton, 1647-1727. p.
Marlborough. 1650-1722. i.
Fenelon, 1651-1716. r
Swift, 1667-1745. i.
Addison, 1672-1719. p.
Peter the Great, 1672-1725. p.
Walpole, 1676-1745. i.
Bach, 1685-1750. p.
Pope, 1688-1744. s.
Swedenborg, 1688-1772. r.
Montesquieu, 1689-1755 s.
Voltaire, 1694-1778. s.
Wesley, 1703-91. r.
Edwards, 1703-58. r.
228 THE OPEN COURT.
Franklin, 1706-90. s.
Fielding, 1707-54. i.
Chatham. 1708-78. i.
Johnson, 1709-84. p.
Hume, 1711-76. s.
Rousseau. 1712-78. s.
Frederick the Great, 1712-86. s.
Diderot, 1713-84. s.
Gray. 1716-71. i.
Alembert, 1717-83. s.
Adam Smith. 1723-90. s.
Kant. 1724-1804. s.
Goldsmith, 1728-74. i.
Catharine II. 1729-96. s.
Lessing, 1729-81. s.
Burke, 1730-97. i.
Washington, 1732-99. p.
Gibbon, 1737-94. s.
Jefferson, 1743-1826. s.
Goethe, 1749-1832. s.
Mirabeau, 1749-91. s.
Fox, 1749-1806. s.
Talleyrand, 1754-1838. s.
Mozart, 1756-91. p.
Hamilton, 1757-1804. s.
Robespierre, 1758-94. s.
Nelson. 1758-1805. i.
Pitt, 1759-1806. i.
Burns, 1759-96. i.
Schiller, 1759-1805. i.
Fichte, 1762-1814. s.
Malthus, 1766-1844. p.
Chateaubriand, 1768-1848. p.
Napoleon, 1769-1821. s.
Wellington, 1769-1852. i.
Beethoven. 1770-1827. i.
Wordsworth. 1770-1850. p.
Hegel, 1770-1831. s.
Scott, 1771-1832. p.
Metternich, 1773-1859. i.
Schelling, 1775-1854. s.
Turner, 1775-1851. i.
Webster, 1782-1852. i.
Bolivar, 1783-1830. i.
Byron. 1788-1824. s.
Peel, 1788-1850. i.
Schopenhauer, 1788-1860. s.
Shelley, 1792-1822. s.
Meyerbeer, 1794-1864. p.
Carlyle, 1795-1881. s.
Ranke, 1795-1866. s.
Keats. 1795-1821. i.
Heine. 1797-1856. s.
Schubert, 1797-1828. i.
Michelet. 1798-1874. s.
Comte, 1798-1857. s.
Balzac, 1799-1850. s.
Macauley, 1800-59. i.
Moltke. 1800-91. i.
Hugo. 1802-85. s.
Dumas, 1802-70. s.
Emerson, 1803-82. s.
Sand, 1804-76. p.
Disraeli, 1805-81. i.
Mill, 1806-73. s.
E. B. Browning, 1806-61. p.
Longfellow, 1807-82. p.
Darwin, 1809-82. s.
Mendelssohn, 1809-47. p.
Lincoln, 1809-65. p.
Tennyson, 1809-92. p.
Gladstone, 1809-98. p.
Cavour, 1810-61. s.
Dickens, 1812-70. i.
R. Browning, 1812-89. p.
Wagner, 1813-83. s.
Bismarck, 1815-98. s.
Ruskin, 1819-1900. s.
Spencer, 1820-1903. s.
George Eliot, 1820-80. s.
Grant, 1822-85. i.
Arnold, 1822-88. s.
Renan, 1823-92. s.
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Huxley, 1825-95. s.
Ibsen. 1828-1906. s.
Tolstoy, 1828-1010. p.
Rossetti. 1828-82. p.
Taine, 1829-93. s .
Grouping these men by centuries (counting in each period
those born in its first half and in the last half of the previous cen-
tury) we get the following results:
CENTURY.
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tion from the fervent piety of the Middle Ages to the secularity of
modern times. It was then, consequently, that the two middle
classes reached their maximum, at the expense of the extremes.
Great men on the whole hostile to religion are absent from the
four centuries preceding the Reformation ; are a small group in
the 16th century, gain markedly in the 17th, and reach their maxi-
mum, the enormous figure of more than half the total number, in
the age of Voltaire and the "enlightenment." In the last century
this class loses a trifle, though a slightly smaller per cent than that,
of the indififerents gains. The 18th century was that in which the
warfare of science and theology, was hottest, and consequently
both the extreme classes gained at the expense of the moderates.
In the 19th century men began to feel, as Osier phrased it, that
the battle of Armageddon had been fought and lost ; their attacks
on an institution which had ceased to be dangerous, and which
some regarded as moribund, lost part of the fierceness of the battle
waged by their grandfathers. .
Nothwithstanding some fluctuation, the most impressive gen-
eralization which can be drawn from the whole table is its con-
stancy. With the exception of the fifteenth century, every period
shows a loss for the conservatives and a gain for the radicals. The
general trend of ebbing faith, at least among the intellectuals, is
still more strongly emphasized by a combination and consolidation
of the figures given above, taking two centuries at a time and
fusing the four classes into two. This procedure is certainly
legitimate. Religion would not long survive if nobody cared for
it more than apparently did Shakespeare and Walpole. They may
have been unwilling to attack it, but neither would they labor for
it or risk much in its cause. The grouping under two classes,
known by the names of the extremes, is then as follows:
CENTURY. RELIGIOUS NO. SKEPTICAL NO. RELIGIOUS % SKErTIC.\LVo
12th and 13th 11 100
14th and 15th 15 5 75 25
16th and 17th 35 38 48 52
18th and 19th 25 75 25 75
The regularity of this table is remarkable. Beginning with
100^ the devotees of religion lose almost exactly 25^ every two
centuries, beginning with 0, the skeptics increase by about 25% each
two hundred years.
Speculation as to the future is the most fascinating of idle pas-
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times. It is difficult to believe that the forces which have been
steadily at work for at least eight centuries should suddenly stop,
or greatly alter their direction and velocity. If they do continue
to operate at approximately the same speed, it is plain that prac-
tically all of the distinguished men born between 1850 and 2050 will
be indifferent to and skeptical of, popular Christianity. And if this
is so the masses will slowly but surely follow their leaders. Thought
is a fermenting yeast, which, even in the small quantities the world
has yet been able to produce, has always in the long run leavened
the inert mass of common dough. Great is the spirit of the people,
and powerfully does it color the thought of even the greatest minds,
but it in turn is eventually tinged with the color of its deepest
thinkers. Perhaps it would be truer to say that the mind of the
masses and that of the intellectuals react on each other, so that
their content, while always a little different, constantly tends to
approximate. It is therefore impossible to see in democracy, the
triumph of the average man, a force permanently conservative of
religion. It may not even be a retarding force, for the last two
centuries have been both .the most democratic and the least devout,
and the socialists, those radical democrats, are also inclined to be
hostile to the churches, in which they see champions of outworn
privilege.
But, barring those unpredictable factors which usually play
a large part in the course of events, there are two ways in which
we can conceive how the decline of religion may be stopped. The
example of France lends color to the theory that little faith and a
low birthrate go together, though, to be sure, the example of teem-
ing Germany contradicts it, for the Teuton is almost as rationalistic
as the Frank. If, however, this rule were found to be generally
true, it is plain that the religious nations would supplant the infidel
ones. This is but another way of stating that by selection nature
will conserve those attributes of a race which are most useful to its
preservation, without regard to the abstract question of whether
those attributes conform to alien standards, such as those of science.
Many men have called love a delusion, but if so, it is one so neces-
sary to the preservation of the race that it must always be a power-
ful operative force. So it may be with religion—among the masses.
Again it is imaginable that Christianity may conquer in Asia as
much as it loses in Europe and America. But speculations as to
the future are as inconclusive as they are alluring. At present
almost all that can be done is to make a careful survey of the past.
